The Qualified Immunity Defense: What\u27s “Clearly Established” and What\u27s Not by Blum, Karen M.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 3 Article 4 
April 2014 
The Qualified Immunity Defense: What's “Clearly Established” and 
What's Not 
Karen M. Blum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Blum, Karen M. (2014) "The Qualified Immunity Defense: What's “Clearly Established” and What's Not," 
Touro Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/4 
This Selected Excerpts: Practising Law Institute's Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Program is brought to 
you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro 
Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact 
lross@tourolaw.edu. 
The Qualified Immunity Defense: What's “Clearly Established” and What's Not 
Cover Page Footnote 
24-3 
This selected excerpts: practising law institute's annual section 1983 civil rights litigation program is available in 
Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/4 
THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE:
WHAT'S "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED" AND WHAT'S NOT
Karen M. Blum*
Qualified immunity is a defense for an official who is being
sued in his or her individual capacity for damages. There is no quali-
fied immunity for claims for injunctive relief, nor can an entity or
city raise a qualified immunity defense.' According to the United
States Supreme Court, qualified immunity is meant to protect indi-
vidual officials not only from liability, but also from suit.
2
I. OVERVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
The idea behind the qualified immunity defense is to protect
officials from being dragged through a burdensome discovery process
and trial on insubstantial claims, or on claims that assert violations of
law that were not clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct. If the qualified immunity defense is denied, there is a right
to an immediate interlocutory appeal on the question of law raised by
qualified immunity. An appeal can be taken at the motion to dismiss
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This Article is based on a presentation
given at the Practising Law Institute's Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference on Section 1983
Civil Rights Litigation, in New York, New York.
1 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2007).
2 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
3 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding a qualified immunity defense is
separate from the merits of the action and therefore immediately appealable).
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stage, the summary judgment stage, or both. An interlocutory appeal
should raise the legal question of whether, assuming the facts are as
alleged by the plaintiff (at the motion to dismiss stage), or the evi-
dence is sufficient to support a jury's finding of the facts as alleged
by the plaintiff (at the summary judgment stage), the plaintiff has as-
serted the violation of a clearly established federal right. The inter-
locutory appeal must not be a challenge to the district court's deter-
mination that the evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact for trial.'
Harlow v. Fitzgerald6 was a watershed case for qualified im-
munity, jettisoning what was once a subjective component to the test,
but retaining the objective component which could more easily be
decided as a matter of law by a judge at the early stages of the litiga-
tion. Basically, under Harlow, a public official performing a discre-
tionary function enjoys qualified immunity in a civil action for dam-
ages, provided his or her conduct does not "violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."7 In the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants have the initial
burden to show that a discretionary function was performed, thus
4 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996) ("[R]esolution of the immunity question
may 'require more than one judiciously timed appeal,' because the legally relevant factors
bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on summary judgment than on an earlier
motion to dismiss.").
5 Id. at 313 ("Johnson held, simply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at
summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a
qualified immunity case ...."); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995) ("[W]e hold
that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district
court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial
record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial.").
6 457 U.S. 800.
7 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
502 [Vol. 24
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opening the door for a qualified immunity defense.8
II. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES AND REASONABLE
RELIANCE
In Harlow, the Court indicated there may be some cases
where, although the law was clearly established, "if the official plead-
ing the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove
that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard, the defense should be sustained." 9 This rare "extraordinary
circumstances" exception is applied generally in the situation where
the defendant official has relied on advice of counsel or on a statute,
ordinance, or regulation that is presumptively constitutional. In most
of the cases, courts hold that reliance on the advice of counsel or a
prosecutor is a factor to be considered, but not a determinative fac-
tor.'0 A defendant arguing that the prosecutor, or city attorney, ad-
vised him that he could engage in the activity or that he had probable
cause, is not automatically entitled to qualified immunity. Certainly,
where an officer manipulates the facts or misleads the prosecutor to
establish probable cause, the officer cannot claim qualified immunity
based on the advice then given by the misled prosecutor.1"
The Second Circuit decision in Connecticut ex rel. Blumen-
thai v. Crotty2 established the law pertaining to extraordinary cir-
8 See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11 th Cir. 2007).
9 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
10 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34-35 (lst Cir. 2004) ("[T]he fact of the consul-
tation and the purport of the advice obtained should be factored into the totality of the cir-
cumstances and considered in determining the officer's entitlement to qualified immunity.")
Sornbergerv. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006).
12 346 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2003).
2008] 503
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cumstances arising from reliance on a statute. If a police officer re-
lies on a statute that is presumptively constitutional and the court de-
clares the statute to be unconstitutional, then the officer will usually
have qualified immunity. Reliance on a presumptively valid statute
that is not clearly unconstitutional will usually result in qualified im-
munity even if the court decides the conduct was unlawful.13
However, the presumption was not applied in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in Boles v. Neet.14 In Boles, a prison warden relied on
a regulation that required prisoners to wear orange jumpsuits and
shoes or slippers when they were being transported. The warden re-
lied on that statute when he denied a prisoner the right to wear reli-
gious garb. This turned out to be a violation of the prisoner's rights
and the court held the warden was not protected by reliance on the
regulation.15 The warden argued he was entitled to qualified immu-
nity because he relied on the regulation. The court disagreed, holding
the regulation implicitly supported his position, but did not explicitly
support it, and the prisoner had a clearly established right to practice
his religion or wear religious garb. 6
Likewise, in Lawrence v. Reed,17 a sheriff was denied quali-
fied immunity where he had relied on both a local ordinance and ad-
vice of the city attorney. In Lawrence, a derelict vehicle ordinance
was in effect and the sheriff wanted to clean up a lot that had junk
13 See Crotty, 346 F.3d at 108-09.
14 486 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007).
15 Boles, 486 F.3dat 1184.
16 Id.
17 406 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding reliance on a statute does not, per se, confer
qualified immunity on a state officer).
[Vol. 24
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cars on it. The sheriff went to the city attorney and asked for advice
on how to properly remove the cars from the property in light of the
vehicle ordinance that gave the sheriff permission to do so." The
city attorney advised the sheriff that the ordinance applied and that he
could remove the vehicles. The sheriff had the cars removed and was
sued as a result. The Tenth Circuit held this was a deprivation of
property without due process and denied the sheriff the qualified im-
munity defense.19 The sheriff argued the ordinance allowed the re-
moval and that the city attorney agreed. But the court disagreed,
holding it is common knowledge that an official cannot remove
something from another's property without providing due process.2 °
The dissent argued the court's decision requires sheriffs, prior to act-
ing, not only to consult the city attorney and read the law personally,




The Supreme Court has long advised lower courts on how to
conduct the qualified immunity analysis. Starting with Siegert v. Gil-
18 Lawrence, 406 F.3d at 1229.
19 Id. at 1232-33 (applying a reasonableness test to determine qualified immunity and ex-
plaining "officers are not always entitled to rely on the legislature's judgment that a statute is
constitutional").
20 Id. at 1233.
21 Id. at 1236-39 (Hartz, J., dissenting). Judge Hartz lambasts the majority, arguing Har-
low was misinterpreted and, as a result, officials like the defendant are forced into untenable
situations. Judge Hartz demands to know whether similarly situated officials, to avoid losing
their immunity, are to "go to the law library to check whether the City Attorney has misread
the cases" or "call a professor at the nearest law school." Id. at 1238-39.
2008]
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ley, 22 the Supreme Court suggested as the better approach, and later
mandated as the required approach,23 that lower courts, when con-
fronted with the qualified immunity defense, first decide whether,
under the current law, the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a con-
stitutional right at all.24 Only if the plaintiff actually states a claim
under current law should the lower courts ask whether that law or
right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.25
This "constitutional-question-first" approach assures that the
law will develop and clear standards will be announced to apply to
conduct in the future. If the lower courts went directly to the
"clearly-established-law" prong of the analysis, without answering
the first question, then the law would remain stagnant and unclear,
depriving both officials and citizens of established standards govern-
ing particular conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court wanted the lower
courts to first decide the constitutional merits question on the facts
asserted by the plaintiff, or, if at summary judgment stage, on the
facts the district court assumes to be supported by the evidence. The
court should decide whether this is a protected right under current
law first, and only then turn to determining whether the right was
22 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
23 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) ("[A] court must first de-
termine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at
all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation.").
24 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232 (establishing the first analytical step as determining whether a
clearly established constitutional right was violated, but noting it is a "necessary concomitant
to [this] determination" to decide "whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitu-
tional right at all" (emphasis added)).








There has been considerable resistance to and criticism of this
mandated approach, and my guess is the mandatory nature of the
analysis will likely change in the not-too-distant future. It is just a
matter of getting the right case before the Court where five votes will
agree that this approach is not mandatory and should be adopted
where it makes sense.27 Mellen v. Bunting28 was a case in which the
Supreme Court denied certiorari after the Fourth Circuit performed
the two-part analysis. The Court of Appeals first decided whether the
plaintiff asserted a violation of a constitutional right.29  This claim
challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory supper prayer at the
Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), a public institution. The Court
of Appeals found that mandatory prayer violated the First Amend-
ment, but granted qualified immunity to the head of the school, the
official being sued in his individual capacity, on the ground that the
law was not clearly established at the time.3 °
The Supreme Court denied certiorari but a number of the Jus-
tices made comments respecting the denial. 3' Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, noted the problem posed by
26 Id.
27 The Court recently acknowledged "doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of [the] Sau-
cier[] decision.., especially in cases where the constitutional question is relatively difficult
.... .Id  at 1774 n.4. See also Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting Saucier should be abandoned because it forces courts to pass on
constitutional issues even where the case could be determined on the immunity issue with
"relative ease"); Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 n.10 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.) ("As I have elsewhere indicated, in
appropriate cases, I would allow courts to move directly to the second inquiry.").
28 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
29 See Bunting, 327 F.3d. at 365-68.
30 Id. at 360.
31 Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
20081
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an "unwise judge-made rule under which courts must decide whether
the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation before addressing
the question whether the defendant state actor is entitled to qualified
immunity., 32 Justice Scalia, joined by then Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented from the denial of certiorari, urging that "this general rule
[of refusing to entertain an appeal by a party on an issue as to which
he prevailed] should not apply where a favorable judgment on quali-
fied-immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to
appeal the unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional de-
termination., 33 Likewise, a number of lower court judges have been
critical of the mandatory constitutional-question-first approach, sug-
gesting that courts be allowed to avoid deciding a tough constitu-
tional question where there is a lack of a strong record and briefs.34
Despite the criticism leveled at the approach, it does remain
32 Id. (explaining the constitutional-question-first approach is an inflexible rule requiring
"premature adjudication of constitutional issues" and relaxing the rule could resolve Justice
Scalia's "perceived procedural tangle").
33 Id. at 1023 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
34 See, e.g., McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1253 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (Anderson, J.,
concurring specially) (criticizing the mandatory constitutional-question-first approach and
noting that "twenty-eight states and Puerto Rico have recently urged the Supreme Court in
an amicus brief to reconsider its mandatory Saucier approach to qualified immunity" (citing
Brief for the State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Scott, 127 S. Ct. at
1769 (No. 05-1631), 2006 WL 3747719)); Robinette v. Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 593 n.8 (8th
Cir. 2007) ("[T]he 'law's elaboration from case to case,' would be ill served by a ruling here,
where the parties have provided very few facts to define and limit any holding on the reason-
ableness of the execution of the arrest warrant." (citation omitted)); Buchanan v. Maine, 469
F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We do not think the law elaboration purpose will be well
served here, where the Fourth Amendment inquiry involves a reasonableness question which
is highly idiosyncratic and heavily dependent on the facts."); Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d
978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (repeating the observation that "a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds puts the court in the difficult position of deciding 'far-reaching constitu-
tional questions on a nonexistent factual record' "(quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. United States,
373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004))); Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 583 (6th Cir.
2005) (Sutton, J., concurring, joined by Gibbons, J.) (urging the Supreme Court to "permit
lower courts to make reasoned departures from Saucier's inquiry where principles of sound
and efficient judicial administration recommend a variance").
8
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mandated, and there are many examples of courts following the "ri-
gid 'order of battle.' ,35 For example, in Harveston v. Cunningham36
the Ninth Circuit held, on the first prong of the analysis, that a jury
could find that the use of pepper spray on an individual who was
handcuffed was objectively unreasonable. The court went on to grant
qualified immunity on the clearly-established prong of the test, con-
cluding that, although the suspect was handcuffed, he was still resist-
ing, and a reasonable officer could have believed the use of pepper
spray under such circumstances was lawful.37
Another example, from the Eleventh Circuit, is McClish v.
Nugent38 which held one cannot "assume an answer to the first ques-
tion in order to avoid difficult constitutional issues., 39 The court de-
cided a tough issue involving an individual who stood on the thresh-
old of his home, opened the door when an officer knocked, and was
pulled outside. The man, who was then outside of his home, was ar-
rested, but the police did not have a warrant. Is that a legitimate ar-
rest in light of the Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless
arrests inside one's home? While the court held that this was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, the law was not clearly established,
so the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. ° If a similar situa-
tion arises again, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, an officer engaged
35 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by
Scalia, J. and Ginsburg, J.).
36 216 F. App'x. 682 (9th Cir. 2007).
37 Harveston, 216 F. App'x at 685.
3' 483 F.3d 1231, 1238.
31 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1238.
40 Id. at 1248. For reasoning that leads to the opposite conclusion on the constitutional
question, see McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1996).
20081 509
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in such conduct would not be entitled to qualified immunity; the law
is now clearly established that this conduct violates the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has consistently framed the qualified im-
munity analysis as involving two steps. The first question is whether
there is a constitutional violation asserted at all, and the second ques-
tion is whether the law was clearly established such that a reasonable
officer or official would understand that his or her conduct violates
that right. There are some circuit courts of appeals, however, that
seem to prefer a waltz to the two-step. The First Circuit adds a third
step: "whether an objectively reasonable official would have be-
lieved that the action taken violated that clearly established constitu-
tional right."'4  The Sixth Circuit has a third step in some cases and
not in others.42 This third step can be considered an elaboration of
the second step. Some courts treat the three-part analysis as func-
41 See Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2005) (prescribing a three-part
test).
42 See Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2006).
In determining whether a law enforcement officer is shielded from
civil liability due to qualified immunity, this court typically employs a
two-step analysis: "(1) whether, considering the allegations in a light
most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional right has been vio-
lated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established." This court oc-
casionally considers a third step in the qualified immunity analysis, in
addition to the two steps listed above .... When utilized, this third step
requires an inquiry into "whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evi-
dence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively un-
reasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights."
Id. 893-96. See Causey v. City of Bay City, 442 F.3d 524, 528 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]his
court occasionally employ a three-step qualified immunity analysis, as opposed to the two-
step analysis .... The third step is 'whether the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to indi-
cate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly
established constitutional rights.' "(internal citations omitted)).
10
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tionally identical to the Saucier two-part analysis, 43 however, Judge
Howard, in his concurring opinion in Higgins, argues otherwise. 44
Judge Howard stated that there could be a different outcome in some
cases based on this third step. In essence, he believes the third step is
part of the merits question. Judge Howard conceived of a situation
where a court finds a constitutional deprivation at step one, but at
step three decides the conduct was objectively reasonable and thus
gives the officer qualified immunity. In such a situation, the court
should not have decided there was a deprivation at step one.45 In
other words, if the conduct was in fact objectively reasonable at step
one, Judge Howard would argue there is no constitutional violation.
He believes step three is unnecessary and opens up the possibility for
inconsistent results.
A case out of the Second Circuit, Walczyk v. Rio,46 also used a
third step, but phrased it differently than the First Circuit. "Even if
the right at issue was clearly established in certain respects ... an of-
ficer is still entitled to qualified immunity if 'officers of reasonable
competence could disagree' on the legality of the action at issue in its
particular factual context., 47 After the court went through the steps,
Judge Sotomayor's concurring opinion made some especially good
points.48 Judge Sotomayor said this third step unnecessarily confused
43 See Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriffs Dep't, 446 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2006)
(Howard, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 17.
45 id.
46 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007).
47 Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 154 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
48 Id. at 165-71 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
2008]
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the analysis.49 She argued that it permits the court to decide official
conduct was reasonable even after finding it violated clearly estab-
lished law of which a "a reasonable officer should have known."5
For those who litigate in the Second Circuit and other circuits who
prefer the waltz over the two-step, be aware that the third step tends
to favor defendants in Section 1983 cases because it provides defen-
dants with yet another opportunity to succeed on qualified immunity
grounds.
IV. DISCOVERY PRIOR TO RESOLUTION OF QUALIFED
IMMUNITY
Defendants routinely object to any sort of discovery by the
plaintiff before the qualified immunity issue is resolved. In some
cases, limited discovery may be needed on the qualified immunity is-
sue to properly establish the contours of the right in question. A
court may defer its decision on the immunity question, allow limited
discovery to achieve the requisite factual development and decide the
issue on summary judgment. In Crawford-El v. Britton,51 the Su-
preme Court noted that qualified immunity should serve to protect
public officials from "the costs of 'broad-reaching' discovery," but
also recognized that "limited discovery may sometimes be necessary
before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.
52
41 Id. at 171.
5o Id. at 169.
" 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
52 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593 n.14.
512 [Vol. 24
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For example, the Second Circuit case Iqbal v. Hasty53 in-
volved a citizen of Pakistan who was arrested, detained, convicted,
and deported shortly after September 11. His complaint was not
about the arrest, detention, nor the deportation, but rather that he was
tortured when he was being held. One of the issues raised was
whether the warden of the prison had qualified immunity. The Sec-
ond Circuit remanded the case to the district court, stating that limited
discovery would be appropriate to determine the personal involve-
ment of certain high-level officials named as defendants and discov-
ery of high-level officials might be postponed until discovery of
front-line officials was completed. 4 Courts generally limit discovery
to facts that are necessary to decide the qualified immunity issue.
Hagan v. City of Cleveland,55 from the Northern District of
Ohio, is an interesting case because it is a good example of a court
allowing discovery on a very limited basis. The decedent was pur-
sued by police officers, resulting in a shooting. 6 The officer who
shot the decedent claimed there was a struggle for the officer's gun
and, fearing for his own safety, the officer shot the decedent. 7 The
plaintiff wanted extensive discovery to reconstruct the events, step-
by-step as they occurred, which eventually culminated in the shoot-
ing. 8  The district court refused, allowing only limited discovery
with regard to evidence directly related to the disputed events taking
" 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
14 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177-78.
" No. 1:06CV2507, 2007 WL 893825 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007).
56 Hagan, 2007 WL 893825 at *5.
57 Id.
" Id. at *7.
2008] 513
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place at the location of the shooting.59
Some cases involve a municipality, which is not entitled to
receive qualified immunity.60 A court may decide to let discovery
proceed with respect to the municipality and stay discovery with re-
spect to individual defendants. A court could also somehow limit
discovery so as not to violate the protection afforded the individual
defendant by the qualified immunity defense. In Alice L. v. Dusek,6 1
the Fifth Circuit allowed discovery to proceed against an individual
defendant with respect to Title IX claims asserted against the school
district, although the individual defendant was on appeal from a de-
nial of qualified immunity with respect to section 1983 claims as-
serted against her in her individual capacity.62
V. DETERMINING WHEN LAW IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
In Wilson v. Layne,63 the plaintiff argued that police officers
violated the Fourth Amendment when they brought a Washington
Post reporter with them into a private home during the execution of a
warrant.64 The Supreme Court unanimously held there was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.65 The Court went as far back as 1604
to Semayne's Case,66 and to Blackstone's Commentaries, both es-
'9 Id. at *8.
60 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)).
61 492 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2007).
62 Alice L., 492 F.3d at 565. See also Tubar v. Clift, No. C05-1154JCC, 2006 WL
521683, at *24 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2006) (allowing discovery to proceed against a mu-
nicipality while limiting discovery as to individual officers raising qualified immunity).
63 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
64 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607-08.
65 Id. at 614.
66 (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.).
[Vol. 24
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pousing the concept that a man's home is his castle.67 In the second
part of the analysis, the Court held that the law was not clearly estab-
lished. Justice Stevens disagreed and argued the law was clearly es-
tablished in such a way that an officer would have understood bring-
ing the press into a private home was a violation of the Constitution.6"
The Court pointed to three sources that might clearly establish
the law. One was decisions of the Supreme Court that stated either
general principles or principles on point applicable to the facts of the
particular case. The second was controlling authority from the juris-
diction-that circuit's court of appeals or the highest court of the
state in which the case was sitting. Finally, the Court indicated that,
absent controlling precedent from one's own circuit, one could look
outside the jurisdiction for "a consensus of cases of persuasive au-
thority. 69 In the absence of controlling authority, the majority of cir-
cuits will consider cases from other jurisdictions on the clearly-
established-law prong of the analysis. Neither the Second Circuit nor
the Eleventh Circuit will consider case law from other circuits in de-
ciding whether the law was clearly established.70 The Second Circuit
67 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609-10 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *223).
68 Id. at 619-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
70 See, e.g., Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) ("When neither the Su-
preme Court nor this court has recognized a right, the law of our sister circuits and the hold-
ings of district courts cannot act to render that right clearly established within the Second
Circuit."); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 & n.1 1(11 th Cir. 2002) ("Although we
cite and examine other circuits' and district courts' decisions under the first prong of Sau-
cier, we point out that these decisions are immaterial to whether the law was 'clearly estab-
lished' in this circuit for the second prong of Saucier."); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of
Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("In this circuit, the law can be 'clearly estab-
lished' for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.").
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has a specific test to identify clearly established law.7
In Saucier v. Kat, 72 Hope v. Pelzer,73 and Brosseau v. Hau-
gen,74 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of defining the con-
tours of the right in the Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment
contexts. It is no accident that these three cases came from the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuit because these circuits are clearly on the edge in
terms of defining the right for qualified immunity purposes. In the
Ninth Circuit, prior to Saucier, an excessive force case would almost
always go to a jury because it was considered clearly established that
the use of objectively unreasonable force was excessive and violated
the Fourth Amendment. Whether a particular use of force was objec-
tively unreasonable was generally a question of fact for the jury.75 In
the Eleventh Circuit, very few cases went to a jury. The law was
never clearly established unless there was a case with "materially
similar facts. ' ,76
71 The Second Circuit follows a three-factor test to determine when a right is "clearly es-
tablished" for the purposes of a qualified immunity analysis:
(1) whether the right in question was defined with "reasonable specific-
ity"; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the appli-
cable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3)
whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would
have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.
Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1991).
72 533 U.S. 194.
" 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
14 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
75 Note that in Scott, the Supreme Court held that where the facts are undisputed, the
Fourth Amendment question of objective reasonableness is a "pure question of law." Scott,
127 S. Ct. at 1776 n.8.
76 See, e.g., Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Any case law that a
plaintiff relies upon to show that a government official has violated a clearly established
right must pre-date the officer's alleged improper conduct, involve materially similar facts,
and 'truly compel' the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law."); Lassiter
v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (1 1th Cir. 1994) ("For qualified immunity to
be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow
16
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In Saucier, Hope, and Brosseau, the Supreme Court talks out
of both sides of its mouth. The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for
being too loose in its analysis and advised that the court should con-
sider more facts and define the right with more particularity. Would
an objectively reasonable officer in these particular circumstances
understand that his or her conduct violated a constitutional right? In
Brosseau, the Court reversed the denial of qualified immunity on
prong two of the analysis because the plaintiff pointed to no case that
"squarely govem[ed]" the situation confronting Officer Brosseau in
that case, "whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture
through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at
risk from that flight."77
In Hope, the plaintiff alleged that he was handcuffed to a
hitching post for seven hours in the hot sun, without bathroom breaks
and with no or very little water.78 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
alleged conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, but affirmed the
district court's grant of qualified immunity on the clearly-established-
law prong of the analysis. 79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiff
had asserted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.8" The Court re-
versed, however, as to the grant of qualified immunity. The Court
explained:
or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government
agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.").
77 Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200-01.
78 Hope, 536 U.S. at 734-35.
80 Id. at 736.
'o Id. at 73 7.
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Our opinion in Lanier thus makes clear that of-
ficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances.
Indeed, in Lanier, we expressly rejected a requirement
that previous cases be "fundamentally similar." Al-
though earlier cases involving "fundamentally similar"
facts can provide especially strong support for a con-
clusion that the law is clearly established, they are not
necessary to such a finding. The same is true of cases
with "materially similar" facts. Accordingly, pursuant
to Lanier, the salient question that the Court of Ap-
peals ought to have asked is whether the state of the
law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that their
alleged treatment of Hope was unconstitutional.8'
The Court held that fair warning was given as to the unconsti-
tutionality of the use of the hitching post for punitive purposes. First,
the Court suggested that its own Eighth Amendment precedent gave
respondents fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.82
Second, binding Eleventh Circuit precedent clearly established that
handcuffing inmates to fences and cells for long periods of time was
impermissible punishment.83 The Court found unreasonable the dis-
tinction drawn by the court of appeals between handcuffing an inmate
to a fence or cell for a prolonged period and handcuffing him to a
81 Id. at 741.
82 Id. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (finding unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 346 (1981) (finding inflictions of pain without penological justification violate Eighth
Amendment).
83 Hope, 536 at 742-43 (citing Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)). Cases
decided by the Fifth Circuit before 1981 are binding in the Eleventh Circuit today. See Bon-
ner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). The Court also noted Ort v. White,
813 F.2d 318, 324 (1 1th Cir. 1987), which stood for the premise that "physical abuse di-
rected at [a] prisoner after he terminate[s] his resistance to authority would constitute an ac-
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hitching post for seven hours, a distinction that "expose[d] the danger
of a rigid, overreliance on factual similarity.
Plaintiffs will cite to Hope. All that is needed is "fair warn-
ing" for the law to be clearly established. The defendants point to the
language from Saucier and Brosseau, cases where the Supreme Court
has required the right to be framed with more particularity and with
facts that would indicate to a reasonable officer that his conduct vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. There is something for everyone in the
language of the Supreme Court, which is part of the confusion sur-
rounding qualified immunity.
There is a case in the Eleventh Circuit that serves as a good
framework for conducting the clearly-established-law analysis. In
Vinyard, the court identifies three ways in which "fair and clear no-
tice can be given. ' 5 First, there may be a case of "obvious clarity"
where words of a federal statute or constitutional provision are so
clear and the conduct so bad that anyone would know this was a vio-
lation of clearly established law.86 For example, in Tekle v. United
States,8 7 more than twenty police officers surrounded an eleven-year-
old boy. Is there any need to have weapons drawn and put the boy in
handcuffs for twenty minutes? The court says that conduct is clearly
unlawful. In Jennings v. Jones,88 a case from the First Circuit, a po-
lice officer increased the use of force by twisting the plaintiffs ankle,
even after the plaintiff became compliant, until the ankle broke.
14 Hope, 536 U.S. at 742,
8" Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350-53.
86 Id. at 1350.
87 511 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2007).
S499 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 2007).
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These are cases where a court may conclude that a reasonable officer
would understand the alleged conduct is unlawful even without a
similar case on point.
In the second category, there may exist broad statements of
the law or principles rendered in prior decisions on a set of facts dif-
ferent from those before the court, but those principles can be applied
"with obvious clarity" to the case currently in front of the court.89
One example is the Second Circuit case of Jones v. Parmley.90 In
Jones, the Second Circuit held that general principles announced by
the Supreme Court with respect to police interference with demon-
strations and the requirement that there be "clear and present danger"
presented by the demonstrators before such interference was justified,
applied with obvious clarity to the facts in the case before it. Given
the overall orderly, peaceful nature of the protest, reasonable officers
would have known that charging the crowd and arresting protesters
indiscriminately violated clearly established law.91
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland92 is also a good exam-
ple of a court applying general principles of law announced in Su-
preme Court decisions to a case involving a different factual setting.
In Holloman, the Eleventh Circuit held that the principles flowing
from the Supreme Court decisions in Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District9 3 and Burnside v. Byars,94 cases in-
'9 Vinyard, 311 F.3dat 1351.
90 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006).
91 Jones, at 60-61.
92 370 F.3d 1252 (11 th Cir. 2004).
93 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
94 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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volving a student's right to free expression, applied with obvious
clarity to the situation where a teacher punished a student for raising
his arm in a fist during recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.95
Yet another example of a court holding that general principles
declared in one setting could clearly establish the law in a different
factual context is Landis v. Cardoza.96 In Landis, the district court
concluded that Sixth Circuit decisions in cases involving the unwar-
ranted use of pepper spray applied with obvious clarity in a case of an
unwarranted use of a Taser.97 Because it was clearly established that
police officers must refrain from using pepper spray on an unresisting
person, the Landis court, considering pepper spray analogous to
Tasers, denied the officers qualified immunity.98
Where the facts before the court do not present conduct that is
clearly unlawful under the wording of the statutory or Constitutional
provision invoked, and where general principles of law do not apply
with obvious clarity to this different set of facts, the Eleventh Circuit
in Vinyard suggests that "precedent that is tied to the facts" of the
present case will be needed to give "fair and clear notice" of the un-
lawful nature of the conduct.99 This may involve cases where the
court determines that no officer could ascertain from the general
principles that certain conduct violated those general principles. To
95 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1278-79.
96 515 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
97 Landis, at 814-15.
98 Id. Landis involved death that resulted from a man allegedly resisting arrest. In deny-
ing summary judgment to the police officers, the judge noted the decedent was allegedly
beat with nightsticks, stunned with a Taser, hit with pepper spray and held with his head un-
der water while handcuffed. Id. at 812-13.
99 Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350-51 (emphasis omitted).
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properly put the officer or official on notice, a more fact-specific kind
of precedent must be in place, precedent that cannot be distinguished
in a fair way from the facts of the present case. For example, in
Campbell v. Galloway,'00 the Fourth Circuit held that the broad legal
principle "that public employees may not be fired on a basis that in-
fringes on their First Amendment rights" was insufficient to give a
reasonable chief of police notice that plaintiffs speech in the present
case was on a matter of public concern and protected.'0'
VI. ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND JURY IN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Often, qualified immunity cannot be resolved prior to trial or
without trial, especially in excessive force cases, where commonly
there will be genuine issues of material fact in dispute that need to be
resolved by a jury. When there is a trial, the question is what be-
comes of the qualified immunity defense; who decides what and
how? Does the jury decide the qualified immunity issue if it still ex-
ists? If so, how? If not, then how does the court decide the issue of
qualified immunity as a matter of law after the jury has decided the
facts?
In a recent decision, Zellner v. Summerlin,10 2 the Second Cir-
cuit stated that qualified immunity is a question of law to be decided
by the judge. If there are material issues of fact in dispute, they can
100 483 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2007).
10l Id. at 271.
102 494 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, in Hosty v. Carter, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that general principles of law with respect to the free speech rights of students would
not put a reasonable dean on notice that demand for review before the university would pay a
student publication's printing bills violated the First Amendment. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d
731, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2005).
[Vol. 24
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be sent to the jury through special interrogatories. In fact, the Second
Circuit has made it clear that if the defendant raises the qualified im-
munity defense and wants it to survive throughout the jury trial, hop-
ing to make a post-trial motion on the qualified immunity issue once
the jury has come back, then the defendant is responsible for request-
ing that the jury be asked the necessary questions for the court to de-
cide the qualified immunity issue.103
In Lee v. McCue,10 4 the court held that it is the defendant's
burden to request special interrogatories that would elicit the neces-
sary factual findings from the jury that would serve as the basis for
the court's qualified immunity determination. If the defendant fails
to do so, the court, in deciding the post-trial motion on qualified im-
munity, is going to take the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. How the jury decided the facts, in other words, is based on
how the jury could have construed them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. The important point is that the court, in deciding the
qualified immunity issue post-trial, will view the facts from the plain-
tiff s perspective unless the defendant puts specific questions to the
jury and gets answers that would be unfavorable to the plaintiff's
case.
There are also cases where the Second Circuit has said the
district court should put the qualified immunity question about objec-
tive reasonableness to the jury. In the recent case Higazy v. Tem-
pleton,105 decided after Zellner, the court of appeals implied qualified
103 Id. at 368.
104 No. 04-civ-6077, 2007 WL 2230100, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007).
105 505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007).
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immunity is an issue that can go to the jury. Higazy, a post-9/11
case, involved a young Middle Eastern man whose parents put him
up in the Millennium Hilton Hotel, across from the Twin Towers,
while he was going to school. After the hotel was evacuated on 9/11,
hotel security discovered a short wave radio transceiver-the type
that can be used to communicate with commercial aircraft-evidently
in the safe of the room where Higazy had been staying, along with
Higazy's passport and a copy of the Koran. Upon returning to the
hotel months later, Higazy was confronted by police. An FBI agent
informed the boy that he was being arrested on a material witness
warrant.10 6 After Higazy had been detained for a long period of time
as a material witness, it became apparent the transceiver belonged to
a commercial pilot who had been staying at the hotel. As a result,
Higazy brought a Bivens suit against the federal agent, and the court
held that a reasonable jury could have concluded that a reasonable of-
ficer would have understood that he was violating the plaintiff's con-
stitutional right against compelled self-incrimination when he co-
erced a confession that would have been used in a criminal case. The
court viewed the question of objective reasonableness as a "mixed
question of law and fact," which could be decided as a matter of law
where the relevant facts were undisputed, but which should go to a
jury when the facts were in dispute.10 7
The decision in Husain v. Springer10 8 also implied that the
jury could hear the qualified immunity issue. The Second Circuit
106 Id. at 165.
107 Id. at 170 (citing Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1994)).
108 494 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007).
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held that the nullification of a school election based on content pub-
lished in the college newspaper violated the student journalists' clear-
ly established First Amendment rights, but that a jury could find that
the college president should be afforded qualified immunity if it was
reasonable for her to believe her actions were lawful.'0 9 To get a
sense of the confusion created when the issue of qualified immunity
is given to the jury, take a look at Stephenson v. Doe.'10 In Stephen-
son, the Second Circuit confronted inconsistent verdicts that resulted
from the trial court having given both the substantive Fourth
Amendment excessive force issue and the qualified immunity issue to
the jury. In remanding for a new trial, the court of appeals advised
the district court that "[t]he court should charge the jury on excessive
force, but not on qualified immunity. If the jury returns a verdict of
excessive force against [the defendant], the court should then decide
the issue of qualified immunity.""'1
There are many jury-or-judge qualified immunity questions,
and Curley v. Klein, 1 2 from the Third Circuit, has a very good sum-
mary of the positions of the circuits on this issue. According to the
Curley court, "[t]he First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have all indicated that qualified immunity is a question of law re-
served for the court," whereas "[t]he Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have permitted the question to go to juries." ' 1 3 The "[p]rece-
dent from the Second and Eighth Circuits can be viewed as being on
109 Husain, 494 F.3d at 131-34.
110 332 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2003).
111 Stephenson, 332 F.3d at 80.
112 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007).
"' Curley, 499 F.3d at 208.
2008]
25
Blum: The Qualified Immunity Defense: What's “Clearly Established” and
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
both sides of the issue, with the evolution being toward reserving the
question for the court."'" 
4
The merits issue in Curley turned on whether the officer made
a reasonable mistake of fact. If the officer's mistake was reasonable,
then that goes to the merits, and there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. The qualified immunity question, on the other hand, turned
on whether the officer was reasonable in thinking his conduct did not
violate the plaintiff's clearly established rights." 15 Curley was a mis-
taken identity case, where a New Jersey state trooper mistook a Port
Authority officer for a suspect and shot him. The state trooper was
involved in the high-speed pursuit of a man who shot another officer
on the New Jersey Turnpike and fled to the George Washington
Bridge. The man who was pursued by the trooper tried to blaze
through the tollbooth at the bridge, but smashed into another car and
then decided to kill himself. His body was evidently lying on the
front seat of his wrecked car, and the airbags had deployed when he
crashed.
After the crash, a Port Authority officer stationed at the bridge
approached the car-and because he'd heard the radio traffic about
the shooting on the Turnpike, he had his gun drawn. The state
trooper, still in pursuit, then appeared, exited his car, and approached
the wrecked car with the now-deceased suspect still inside. At this
point, however, there becomes a controverted factual issue: Did he
look in? Should he have? Was it reasonable for him not to look in?
If he did, could he have seen the body and known the man was dead?
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As the trooper approached the car, the trooper saw the Port Authority
officer, but did not recognize him-it was night, the Port Authority
officer was not wearing his hat, and, like the suspect, was a black
male-and fired at him. Again, there was a question of fact. Could
the trooper have seen the emblem on the Port Authority officer's
shirt?
After a convoluted procedural history, the case finally went to
the jury with ten special interrogatories addressing the factual dis-
putes surrounding Officer Klein's approach to the suspect's car and
his subsequent confrontation with Curley. In addition, the jury was
given a separate liability verdict sheet with four questions, three re-
garding the objective reasonableness of Klein's actions and one di-
rected at causation. Upon reaching the Third Circuit, two out of the
three judges on the panel decided that even though it looked as if the
trial judge intended to give the qualified immunity issue to the jury,
the jury's answers to the liability questions reflected no constitutional
violation on the merits.' 16 Judge Roth, in dissent, was of the opinion
that the trial court did put the issue of qualified immunity to the jury
and that constituted error. He interpreted the answers to the liability
questions as having established that there was a constitutional viola-
tion. "7 Curley exemplifies the confusion that ensues when juries are
given questions of qualified immunity.
While there is case law going both ways on this, the ultimate
issue of qualified immunity should not be given to the jury. It creates
nothing but chaos. In Curley, the Third Circuit, like the Second Cir-
116 Id. at215.
1"7 Id. at 223 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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cuit in Stephenson, adopted the view that "the court, not a jury,




Where qualified immunity is still in play when a case goes to trial,
the jury should be given special interrogatories to resolve the key fac-
tual disputes, but the ultimate legal question of qualified immunity
should be left to the judge.
118 Curley, 499 F.3d at 223. See also Bradley v. Jusino, No. 04 Civ. 8411, 2008 WL
417753, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008). While "substantial evidence [may have] sup-
port[ed] the jury's determination that Jusino was entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
erred in submitting the question.., to the jury. Under... Stephenson, and its progeny, Jus-
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